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LIBERALISM AND THEORIES OF
ADJUDICATION'
THOMAS D. BARTON *
One recurring theme of the Critical Legal Studies Movement is skepticism that an
acceptable, or even coherent, theory of adjudication can be constructed from the various
political and philosophical doctrines known as liberalism.' This position is perhaps best
articulated in Roberto Unger's comprehensive work on liberal psychology, 2 and in a
powerful pair of articles by Mark Tushnet.' Unger and Tushnet assert the logical im-
possibility of simultaneously supporting three liberal positions: first, that judicial review
should be available to curb majoritarian excesses; second, that judicial independence
should be restrained structurally, to foreclose the possibility of judicial anarchy; and
third, that adjudication should be "value-free," that is, that judges should not appeal in
their decisionmaking to unwritten, transcendent values. 4 From the interaction of these
three propositions arise contradictions allegedly irresolvable by any liberal theory of
adjudication.' The liberal principle that seeks to empower an independent judiciary
conflicts, it is said, with the equally revered policy that judges must discharge the law
rather than personal opinion, which in turn is incompatible with a traditional liberal
reluctance to articulate timeless social and ethical values. These three balls never have
been juggled successfully, say the skeptics, and never will be. The prospect for liberal
t c9 1087, THOMAS 11 BARTON.
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.A., 1971, Tulane University; ID., 1974, Cornell
University; Ph.D., 1982, Cambridge University.
I See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) [hereinafter R. UNGER]; Mare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN,
L. REV. 265, 337-39 (1978); Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory — And Its Future, 42 OHIo ST.
L.J. 223 (1981); Singer, The Player and the Cards, Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984)
and sources cited therein; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983) [hereinafter Following the Rules]; Tushnet, Darkness
on the Edge of Town: The Contribution of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980)
[hereinafter Darkness 077 the Edge of Town]; Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L.
Rrv. 563, 563-602 (1983) [hereinafter Critical Studies Movement]; cf. Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral
Dialogue: Man and Manna in the Liberal State, 28 UCLA L. REv. 816, 817-18 (1981) (discussing B.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE 1-IRERAL STATE (1980)); Moore, The Semantics of judging, 54 S.
CAI,. L. REv. 151, 160-61 (1981).
2 R. UNGER, supra note I.
s Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 1; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town, supra note 1.
4 Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town, supra note I, at 1037-38.
s Id. at 1038, 1061. See also R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 6-7, 97.
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legal theory is thus gloomy, as each new attempted reconciliation is merely a slightly
different instance within the inescapable three-cornered conundrum. Regardless of its
level of abstraction, therefore, liberalism is said to provide unreliable and ineffectual
guidance to the difficult choices that attend constitutional and common law adjudications
Policy in liberal society is thus described as adrift, parts of a ship long ago ripped
apart by conflicting forces. Similarly, Unger and Tushnet also argue that individuals and
their respective beliefs are radically isolated in a liberal society.' The atomized view of
truth that results from this isolation is said to hamper empathetic understanding among
people, thereby preempting the formation of community values.° Conflicts concerning
society's goals and methods are thus allegedly perpetuated amid personal acrimony and
confusion. By implication, the two authors would reform drastically, or replace, liberal
culture with conditions enabling the emergence of a more unified, harmonious corn-
triunity.° In other words, their envisioned solution is to transcend the mistrust, disunity,
and pluralism that propels liberal philosophy. In their view this can occur only through
the emergence of shared community values of such vigor as to make institutional checks
and balances superfluous. This solution quickly faces another obstacle from liberalism:
In social life as in political and legal life, the critics claim that liberalism retards community
harmony by its celebration of conflict, and its insular version of truth. Therefore, for
many in the Critical Movement, liberal values must be resisted strongly, or even dis-
carded, so as to achieve ethical and political unity.
This Article disputes that Critical analysis, and attempts to outline an understanding
of adjudication that satisfies the liberal goals of institutional power-sharing, pluralism,
and individualized decisionmaking based, on rational dialogue. In fashioning this un-
derstanding, this Article examines and rejects various aspects of contemporary legal
theory. Critical skepticism provides invaluable insights into that process. Nonetheless,
the Article takes issue with the conclusion of some writers that liberal values impede the
development and functioning of legal and social life. On the contrary, it may well be
that the liberal attributes of conflict, disharmony, piecemeal problem-solving, and even
philosophical incoherence contribute to a workable and desirable system of law. The
Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 1, at 784-86, 824-27; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge
of Town, supra note 1, at 1057-62; R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 97.
7 R. UNGER, supra note I, at 55-59; Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 1, at 783-86.
R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 102-03; Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 1, at 826-27.
9 Tushnet's call for dialogue based on interpersonal understandings, scarcely feasible under his
rendering of liberalism, seems to warrant this implication. See Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra
note 1, at 824-27. Unger writes: "Liberalism must be seen all of a piece, not just as a set of doctrines
about the disposition of power and wealth, but as a metaphysical conception of the mind and
society. Only then can its true nature be understood, and its secret empire overthrown." R. UNGER,
supra note 1, at 6. Accordingly, linger aims toward a nonliberal conception of mind and society
that "vindicates the claims of communities of shared purposes against the liberal conception of
society as an association of independent and conflicting individuals." Id. at 20. Elsewhere, however,
Unger seems to have softened this position in favor of one much closer to what is advocated in this
article:
The program 1 have described is neither just another variant of the mythic, antiliberal
republic nor much less sonic preposterous synthesis of the established democracies
with their imagined opposite. Instead, it represents superliberalism [1]t represents
an effort to make social life resemble more closely what politics (narrowly and tradi-
tionally defined) are already largely like in the liberal democracies: a series of conflicts
and deals among more or less transitory and fragmentary groups.
Unger, Critical Studies Movement, supra note I, at 602.
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role of liberalism is to promote diverse and imaginative opinions, and to use such disunity
to constrain the abuse of power by both the judge and the legislator. Such constraints
are accomplished by structures internal to liberal legal systems. If the effectiveness of
liberalism is disputed, the explanation may lie not with the inadequacies of liberalism,
but rather with the architects of legal theory and their detractors, most of whom chron-
ically undervalue the dynamic power of liberal conflict and disharmony.
Unger and Tushnet provoke two specific questions that shall be addressed in this
Article: first, is the liberal model of truth as atomized and subjective as they claim?
Second, is the only solution to adjudicative theory to make it superfluous through ethical
and political uniformity?'° Notwithstanding their major contributions toward under-
standing the interplay of law and social and political forces, they err by attempting to
describe liberalism too precisely. Because of this impulse, they adopt a highly rationalistic
methodology that underestimates the diversity of concepts that comprise liberalism."
Moreover, they thereby fail to explore the ironic possibility that philosophical inconsis-
tencies may contribute both to the persistence of liberalism, and to the political dialogue
that they seek.
In the sections below, the Unger/Tushnet analysis is elaborated and used to examine
the assumptions underlying a variety of contemporary legal theories." Next, their as-
sertion of the incoherence of liberalism is shown to be an unjustified generalization."
Finally, liberal adjudication is examined from an alternative, stronger perspective, with
the aim of reconciling liberal goals in a fashion that renders immaterial the issues of
coherence and consistency.' 4 Liberal conflict and disharmony are neither ends in them-
selves, nor does a careful and precise fashioning of a workable legal system result from
such conflict; but ethical, social, and political disunity complement a normative system that is
essentially beyond human control. Through the ideas articulated in reasoned debate, the
legal system has the raw materials with which to refine the justness of its own indeter-
minacy. The seeming paradox of this sentence is resolved only when, as elaborated in
the concluding portions of the Article, the focus of lawmaking and legal decisions moves
away from the human mind, and to the legal system that many minds gradually have
created. Ethical and social unity are potentially dangerous concepts, and not only for
holders of minority opinions. It is not clear that our legal system could survive total
consensus.
I. THE ATOMISTIC MODEL OF LIBERAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND ITS EFFECTS ON
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THEORY
Liberalism as a philosophy, and as a way, of constructing power-sharing governmen-
tal institutions, emerged from Renaissance secularism and expansion of trade." Its
10 See R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 100-03; Tushnet, Fallowing the Rules, supra note 1, at 826-27.
" R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 9. In Law's EMPIRE, Ronald Dworkin also criticizes Professor
Tushnet's description of liberalism, along lines similar to some of those taken in this Article. R.
DWORKIN, Law's EMPIRE 440-41 n.19 (1986). This Article was substantially completed prior to the
appearance of Professor Dworkin's book.
12 See infra notes 15-138 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 141-174 and accompanying text.
14
 See infra notes 176-219 and accompanying text.
15 G. DIETZE, LIBERALISM PROPER AND PROPER LIBERALISM 51-53 (1985); j. H. HALLOWELL, THE
DECLINE OF LIBERALISM As AN IDEOLOGY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMAN POLITICO-
LEGAL THOUGHT 21 (1946); H. LASKI, THE RISE OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 11-58 (1962).
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primary policies include freedom of the marketplace, the rule of law, the prevention of
tyranny through structural checks and balances, and the advancement of individuals as
free moral agents.'° Unger argues that one of liberalism's key metaphysical positions is
opposition to the ancient doctrine of "intelligible essences."" This doctrine posits that
all things display an irreducible essence that can be apprehended humanly, albeit no-
nempirically.i° In the investigation of the physical world, the doctrine of intelligible
essences was almost completely eclipsed by the advances of the scientific method, which
attempts to analyze or "reduce" things or phenomena into increasingly smaller parts.
Were scientists to posit, for example, that gold has a fundamentally different essence
than iron as revealed by their differing respective properties, little progress in atomic
theory could be made. So also in political history, some liberals have criticized the
intelligible essence doctrine or related legal doctrines, such as the medieval jus naturale,
for the social stagnation that it entails.i° More recently, Karl Popper has argued that
"essences" are little more than definitions, which are then used as premises from which
undisputable analytical truths are deduced logically. 20
 Scientific and social progress are
thereby equally frustrated. As shall be developed, Unger anchors his analysis of the
evolution and composition of liberalism in liberalism's alleged opposition to the doctrine
of intelligible essences and its corollaries.
The intangibility of metaphysical issues tends to cast a certain pedantic air to the
disputes about them. Yet the question of whether everything is reducible to something
else, or rather has an irreducible essence, has vital epistemological and social implications.
First, the issue of reducibility affects whether truth is deemed to be personal or social.
Second, the issue determines whether knowledge should be attained by decomposing
things into discretely intelligible parts, or whether knowledge is better discovered by
investigating undivided wholes and their emergent properties.
On the first point, Unger states that liberals dispute the existence of social knowl-
edge. 21
 They are said to deny independently existing, "objective" essences, which neces-
sarily includes objectively existing ethical values. 22 All values, says Unger, must for liberals be
only "subjective," that is, the result of personal preference. 23 Furthermore, if all values
are subjective, then logically, liberals must believe in "value-free adjudication." 24 Unger
maintains that liberals cannot hold that judicial review, for example, is informed by a
set of culturally approved values independent from the personal preferences of the
judge, because to believe in values that transcend individuals is to believe that there exist
objective, intelligible essences. 25 This proposition will be described below as "the subjec-
tivity of truth" proposition.
Concerning the second point, Unger contends that liberal epistemology entails the
belief that all things may be fully understood by the process of decomposition. He thus
16 See generally Di•rzc, supra note 15; LASKI, supra note 15; D.J. MANNING, LIBERALISM (1976);
A. RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1984).
"R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 31-32, 76-77, 133.
1 s Id. at 31.
19 See H. LASKI, supra note 15, at 11-12, 14; cf. 2 K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS
ENEMIES: THE HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY: HEGEL AND MARX 10-12 (5th ed. 1966).
20 2 K. POPPER, supra note 19, at 9-12.
21 R. UNGER, SUpra note 1, at 76-77.
22 Id,
23 Id.
24
 Id. at 94-97.
25 Id.
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suggests that one defining element of liberalism is the belief that nothing can be more
than the sum of its respective parts, and through exhaustive analysis of those parts the
whole can be completely apprehended. 20 This epistemological proposition will be re-
ferred to below as the "whole and parts" doctrine.
After detailing these two epistemological propositions and their respective criticisms,
this Article will argue that neither principle is a necessary belief of liberalism." On the
contrary, illustrations are supplied of alternative positions that have informed liberal
thinkers." By revealing the epistemological options for liberals, and by demonstrating
the disruptive influence that Unger-style beliefs have had on liberal efforts to construct
satisfactory legal and political theories, the way is cleared for the emergence of a more
cogent liberal theory of adjudication."
A. The Subjectivity of Truth
Unge•'s contention that liberals view truth as radically subjective, or atomized, is
best described in a passage discussing values. Unger states:
Values are subjective in the sense that they are determined by choice. Sub-
jectivity emphasizes that an end is an end simply because someone holds it,
whereas individuality means that there must always be a particular person
whose end it is. The opposing conception is the idea of objective value, a
major theme of the philosophy of the ancients. Objective values are standards
and goals of conduct that exist independently of human choice. Men may
embrace or reject objective values, but they cannot establish or undo their
authority.
From the start, liberal political thought has been in revolt against the
conception of objective value.
('The teachings of liberalism must he, and almost always have been, uncom-
promisingly hostile to the classic idea of objective good.3°
The idea of subjective value has indeed been highly influential in contemporary legal
thought, and Unger's insight is valuable. The chronic theoretical conundrum is to
reconcile the "perceived need for judicial objectivity" 31 with the seemingly inescapable
conclusion that the personal belief's of judges strongly influence, if not determine, their
decisions. 32 A common approach to resolving the dilemma has been to hold that the
value choices made by the judiciary must be based on determinations of a "higher
authority."33 This reconciliation by higher authority, however, has had two divergent
expressions, which are characterized below.
2" Id. at 46, 81, 125.
27 See infra notes 40-176 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 151-163, and accompanying text.
z' See infra notes 165-219 and accompanying text.
11' R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 76, 77 (emphasis added).
1 ' Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 495 (1984) [hereinafter
Bennett.
12 Id,
." Id.
630	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:625
1. "No judicial judgment is legitimate, except on grounds that are visibly approved by
the political process."
The first formula for reconciling the need for adjudicative impartiality with the
principle of subjective truth is probably the least satisfactory. Theoretically, this formula
prevents possible judicial anarchy by constraining severely the sort of substantive reason
that can be used to justify any judicial decision. To require the judiciary to look to
politically approved rationales as the bases for their determinations badly compromises
their ability to carry out the liberal goal of providing a check against possible majoritarian
tyranny. Accordingly, advocates of this formula as a means of reconciling their episte-
mology with their political and legal values are at the fringes of the liberal tradition.
They place themselves in a philosophical position not unlike that of Jeremy Bentham,
whose vigorous reformist spirit was accompanied by a strong antipathy to the common
law, and a commensurate heavy reliance on the wisdom and power of legislatures. 34
Among modern writers, this first formula pe'rhaps best describes the approaches taken
by constitutional "originalists" 33 such as Raoul Berger or Robert Bork, 36 and analytical
positivists such as H.L.A. Hart. 37
Constitutional originalists argue that the only constraints on the current majority's
will should be found in a Constitution interpreted strictly on the basis of its framers'
expressed, literal intent. Not surprisingly, their theory results in recommendations of
judicial restraint. Moreover, this favoring of political majoritarianism is strongly empha-
sized at a deeper epistemological level. Their theory tends'to equate truth with individual
preferences. As Ronald Dworkin explains," any theory that focuses on individual inten-
tions, or preferences, is drawn toward a type of utilitarianism that weighs collective
increases and decreases in individual happiness to determine the appropriateness of an
action. Such unprincipled decisionmaking carries dangers of social and ethical irrespon-
34 See D'Amato, Towards a Reconciliation of Positivism and Naturalism: A Cybernetic Approach to a
Problem of Jurisprudence, 14 W. ONT. L. REv. 171,177-78 (1975).
35 See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980)
[hereinafter Brest]. Constitutional originalists look to the intentions of the framers of the Consti-
tution for the political authority they feel is necessary to legitimate specific holdings in cases of
judicial review. Bennett, supra note 31, at 496. The term "originalist" is sometimes used synony-
mously with "interpretivist." The latter word, however, is frequently used to describe those writers
like John Hart Ely and Henry Monaghan who stress the process attributes of Constitutional law.
See J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Monaghan, Our
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353,356 (1981); infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
This article refers to that approach as "proceduralist' as a way of distinguishing such writers from
those like Bork who embrace the subjective theory of truth more heartily.
36 R. BERCER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
The term "originalist" is elastic in several directions. Brest, supra note 35, at 204-05 suggests the
term can also be subdivided into "moderate" and "strict" "textualists," and also "intentionalists."
33 14.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
36
 Dworkin is an advocate of the subjective theory of value, and therefore his criticism of an
epistemology based on individual preferences seems at first blush inconsistent. Dworkin takes great
effort, however, to disassociate his epistemology and ethical theory from utilitarianism. The focus
of Dworkin's work is not individual preferences, but rather individual rights, as interpreted by
judges who have developed comprehensive, principled political and moral philosophies. See infra
notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
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sibility, since the content of the collective preferences is subordinate to the issues of the
numbers of persons holding the preference, and the intensity with which it is held."
In addition to objections concerning the social consequences of adopting the origi-
nalist argument, others have argued that intentionalist theories are based on intellectual
delusion. These commentators assert that the original intentions of the framers of a
document more than two hundred years old simply cannot give "objective" guidance to
contemporary adjudication.'" ' These technical problems associated with the originalist
approach have been summarized as: the practical difficulties of ascertaining the inten-
tions of individuals long dead; the problem of determining what manifestations of an
individual's psyche constitute "intent;" and, if such individual intents are discovered, the
problem of "summing" these intents to derive a group intent. 4 ' The originalist fails,
therefore, to remove the subjective element to judicial decisionmaking. At the same time,
however, the theory could readily result in vulnerability to prevailing majoritarian de-
mands.
The attempt to legitimize judicial judgments on the basis of political higher authority
is also reflected in the analytical positivism of H.L.A. Hart.° Hart responds differently
in particulars from the originalists — especially regarding political connotations of their
theory — but similarly in tying adjudicative legitimacy to its grounding in clearly pro-
mulgated political policy.
Hart's legal theory turns on the need to identify what is properly a "legal rule," and
therefore appropriate as grounds for an adjudicative decision.° Every legal system
promulgates a process by which law is legitimately created. This process Hart refers to
as the "rules of recognition."44 Only where gaps in the law appear, where the legislature
has not clearly expressed itself, are judges free to exercise "discretion" to determine
what the law ought to be. 45 Even in such cases, however, Hart's theory remains true to
the above formula that adjudication is legitimate only when tied to reasons that are
politically declared. This is because when judges exercise this "gap discretion," they must
act in a fashion that is subordinated in two ways to the political process. First, they
should attempt to second-guess the content of what the legislature might do with the
39 Dworkin states:
Can we Find [aril underlying political virtue for the positivist model of constitutional
adjudication expressed in Bork's opinion? I believe so: it is the virtue of economic
efficiency, conceived as the goal of satisfying the preferences of the community overall,
including its political and moral ... preferences Their conviction that the major-
ity's political power should be limited as little as possible — that it should be limited
only by the explicit text of the Constitution or the unambiguous intentions of its
framers — reflects ... an unrestricted utilitarianism that , .. denies any constraint on
the kind of preferences that must be counted in that calculation.
Dworkin, Law's Ambitions far Itself, 71 VA. L. REV. 173,185-86 (1985).
4° See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 31, at 456-65; lirest., .supra note 35; Munzer & Nickel, Does the
Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977); Sandalow, Constitutional
Interpretation, 79 Mien. L. REV. 1033,1060-72 (1981); Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language,
29 UCLA L. REV. 797,806-08 (1982).
41 See Bennett, supra note 31, at 456.
42 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 37; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, supra note 37.
43 N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 229 (1978).
44 H.L.A. HART, TILE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 37, at 92-107.
" Id. at 138-43; cf. Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Discretion: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters
that Bind Judges, 75 CoLum. L. REV, 359-60 (1975).
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question.46 Second, and on a more conceptual level, they are to fashion this content "in
response to the evidence and arguments of the same character as would move the
superior institution if it were acting on its own." 47
As with constitutional originalism, such profound subordination to a political au-
thority compromises significantly the liberal principle that the courts are to provide a
bulwark against tnajoritarianism. 48 Furthermore, this positivist version of the first for-
mula is similarly open to technical objections. In the now famous dialogue between Hart
and Lon Fuller, 49 Fuller sought to demonstrate that it is inherent in the nature of both
morality and language that neither courts nor legislatures can be reduced to a mechanical
role in interpreting the law." Rather, "in applying the statute[s] the judge ... must be
guided not simply by its words but also by some conception of what is fit and proper
; conceptions of this sort are implicit in the practices and attitudes of the society of
which he [or she] is a member."" Fuller's argument has now been much elaborated by
linguistic" and philosophical analysis."
As a device to reconcile core liberal policies with a belief in subjective truth, the
formula that ties adjudicative legitimacy to articulated political policy is inadequate. Both
the originalist version and the positivist version of the formula fail for technical reasons
to remove all discretion from judicial decisionmaking. Moreover, the formula has the
unavoidable effect of substantially weakening the concept of judicial review because of
its deference to external political authorities. The failure of the positivists' efforts ar-
guably led directly to the fashioning of the second formula, which is associated primarily
with the writings of Ronald Dworkin.
2. "Non-political values may be imported into judicial decision-making, but only such
values as will yield the objective, 'right' answer."
This formula is in many respects the converse of the first. The first is a response to
the possibility of judicial anarchy implied by the principle of subjective value, and it
overshoots the mark by drastically weakening judicial independence. The second formula
responds to the possibility of majoritarian despotism by positing the existence of values
that override utilitarian legislative determinations. The device by which judicial anarchy
is prevented is the doctrine that judges are not free to indulge their personal preferences
in declaring or interpreting these higher order, nonpolitical values. Rather, the values
46 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1978).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 84-85.
" L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note
37; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958);
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 37.
'° L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF LAW, supra note 49, at 11-13, 17-18, 39-40, 57-59; Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart, supra note 49, at 644-48; see also D'Amato, supra note
34, at 178.
si L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW Supra note 49, at 59.
" See Moore, supra note 1.
" Much of Dworkin's work, for example, could be described as dedicated to proving Fuller's
proposition. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 149; see also infra notes 154-55 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the "due substance theorists."
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operate in each adjudicative circumstance in a way that is "correct" culturally and
historically, quite independent of the particular judge."
If the "correct" answer is historically determined in a given case, however, what
remains of the theory of subjective value? Dworkin is the primary proponent of this
formula, and the subjective value issue causes great difficulties for him. The torturous
way in which Dworkin struggles to affirm the principle, while also maintaining the
efficacy and respectability of his theory of legislation-trumping "rights," reveals strikingly
the Fundamental tensions identified by Tushnet and Unger." Dworkin unquestionably
supports the theory of subjective value. 55 To avoid inconsistency, therefore, his concept
of rights must remain somehow out of the objective realm. The device Dworkin employs
is to assert that rights are not values beyond human choice, but rather are a way that
judges should reason within the legal system." That is, rights are not content-laden, specific
ideas; rather, Dworkin's rights are the responses of individual judges discharging their
duties to reason in a particular fashion when deciding hard cases. Therefore, the "rights"
do not exist in any given case apart from the reasoning process of the individual judges.
In a sense, then, they remain wholly "subjective." Their strength, their particular artic-
ulation and substance, depend entirely on each individual judge having formulated a
comprehensive political theory by which to decide hard cases." However, Dworkin's
political theory and its implications for hard cases is not mere personal preference. He
believes there is only one right answer to how political, moral, and legal theory arc best
melded in a given hard case. 59
" R, DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 279. He writes: "My arguments suppose that there is often a
single right answer to complex questions of law and political morality." Id. Michael Perry, in THE
coNsTmiTiuN, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 102 (1082) (discussed in Bennett, supra note 31, at
450 n.15) also suggests this possibility, at least in the context of fundamental rights.
"See R. DWORKIN, A MATTER or PRINCIPLE 196-204 (1985); R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at
279-90.
," As Dworkin wrote recently, "[Wet are not a community tied together by a concrete mural
settlement, by shared opinions about the details of what justice and fairness and a decent and
valuable life require. (We would, I believe, be a worse community if we did achieve consensus about
these matters.)" Dworkin, Law's Ambitions for Itself, supra note 39, at 187. See also R. DWORKIN, supra
note 46, at 191-92.
" R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 87; Bennett, supra note 31, at 491-93; Greenawalt, supra note
45, at 367.
56 As Dworkin summarized:
Judges develop a particular approach to legal interpretation by Forming and refining
a political theory sensitive to those issues on which interpretation in particular cases
will depend; and they call this their legal philosophy. It will include both structural
features, elaborating the general requirement that an interpretation must fit doctrinal
history, and substantive claims about social goals and principles of justice. Any judge's
opinion about the best interpretation will therefore be the consequence of beliefs other
judges need not share.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 161-62.
59 As Bennett states:
Ronald Dworkin ... calls for a "fusion of constitutional law and moral theory" as an
antidote to judicial discretion. He repeatedly suggests that the fusion will allow moral
and political philosophy to lead a sufficiently diligent and talented judge to right
answers to questions of constitutional law. In that way, a philosophically inspired theory
provides not only an objective source for judicial values but the authoritative source
as well.
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The device of conceiving rights as the duty of a politically responsible judicial official,
rather than as transcendent, timeless, objectively statable "things," neatly reconciles the
opposing liberal goals of judicial power and judicial restraint within the principle of
subjective value." Theoretically, it accomplishes what Tushnet and Unger deem to be
impossible. Yet it is a difficult system to comprehend, as witnessed by the enduring
confusion over the nature of the duty said to be owed by the judge to decide cases
consistently with both law and the judge's own political theory. 61 The theory also lacks
realism and depends entirely on judges being capable of exercising an almost supernat-
ural (Dworkin would call it "Herculean") power of reasoning. Dworkin's system is there-
fore open to the charge that it lacks a clear procedural and moral direction for judges
to follow. 62
 Consequently, Dworkin has achieved an accommodation of the liberal goals
of judicial power and judicial restraint, but at the possible cost of lack of effectiveness
in achieving either.
The balance-wheel of Dworkin's reconciliation is the "one right answer" thesis, and
specific opposition to this has been articulated from practical and political perspectives.
Practical objections have been articulated, for example, by Sanford Levinson." He main-
tains that the thesis is contrary to the experience of practicing lawyers, 64 for whom the
appearance of even so few as two clear alternatives is a rarity." This criticism is echoed
by Kent Greenawalt," who points out that in ordinary discourse, the existence of dis-
cretion is assessed by whether a range of decisions is acceptable to the persons to whom
the legal system is responsible. 67 Moreover, even if one assumes the case outcome to be
describable by such epistemological absolutes as "true/false"" or "correct/incorrect," and
therefore beyond judicial discretion, the judge inevitably will play a creative, non-absolute
role in both the reasoning process leading to the judgment 69 and in writing the opinion."
Recently, Dworkin has softened the right answer thesis somewhat, through a more
sophisticated analysis of the process of interpretation. 7 i The interpretative role of the
judge is now acknowledged straightforwardly. Curiously, however, Dworkin denies that
judicial interpretation has the latitude to choose between two or more permissible legal
outcomes. This is because in hard cases, as in easy cases, there is always one choice
among a possible range that is the proper outcome. 72 Such a concept of interpretation
Bennett, supra note 31, at 450 (citations omitted); see also Farago, Judicial Cybernetics: The Effects of
Se(f-Referenee in Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 371,379-85 (1980); Greenawalt, supra
note 45, at 360-61; Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361,1381-84 (1979).
° But see Leedes, supra note 59, at 1389, where Dworkin's methodology, if not his explicit
argument, is said to be "a rejection of liberal premises that presuppose a divergence of values
voluntarily chosen by each individual." Id.
61 Cf. Bennett, supra note 31,493-94.
62 See, e.g., id. at 493-95; Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 359-66; Richards, Taking Taking Rights
Seriously Seriously, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265,1307-08 (1977).
66 Levinson, Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on "Thinking Like a Lawyer", (Book Review) 30 STAN.
L. Ray. 1071 (1978).
"Id. at 1083.
65 Cf. Richards, supra note 62, at 1315.
66 Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 368.
67 Id.
68 R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 283; see also Farago, supra note 59, at 407.
00 Farago, supra note 59, at 409.
7° Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 378-81.
'I See Dworkin, supra note 55.
72
 Most recently, Dworkin has argued that in hard cases there may be "competition" among
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would not easily be accepted by those experienced in literary or aesthetic interpretation."
Both Levinson 74 and Gary Leedes," for example, argue that no authoritative answers
emerge from interpretation, absent the existence of some consensus about ultimate
values. For them, the concept of interpretation implies that alternative, but contradictory,
outcomes are possible and valid, unless the society has a strong, excluding version of
truth about all matters touched by the text. To date, however, no such consensus exists
in our society concerning ultimate values." Some would go further and maintain that
even if a consensus were forged regarding general social causes and goals, the inherent
semantic variability in the words of particular legal texts would preclude interpretation
from becoming anything more than "a messy business of guesswork predicated on
practical knowledge of language, conventions, and the situations in which they operate.""
Compounding the interpretative indeterminedness that stems from semantic vari-
ability is the variety of perspective from which a rule may be interpreted." This aspect of
interpretation is particularly prone to manipulation as part of litigation strategy. Judicial
interpretation may proceed from the standpoint of the meanings of the words used,
probably the most common perspective, the intentions of the rule makers, the social
purposes of the rule," or, according to Dworkin, the judge's personal political philoso-
phy." Even the Herculean outcome to a case, therefore, is "right" only according to the
particular criteria that shape the interpretive process.
B. The Doctrine of the Whole and Its Parts
The doctrine of the "whole and parts" describes two related principles ascribed by
Unger to liberalism: the principle of analysis and the principle of individualism. The
two principles are united epistemologically; both consider the "whole" of a thing to be
nothing more than the sum of its parts. Analysis posits that all knowledge may be reduced
to the elementary ideas of which it is composed; individualism states that groups are
nothing more than the collected qualities of their constituent members. 8 ' From this
contending legal principles, but not "contradiction." R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 73-86,243-71.
See also Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 366.
See, e.g., Fish, Wrong Again, 62 Tex. L. REV. 299 (1983); Fish, Working on the Chain Gang:
Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV, 551 (1982) thereinafter Fish, Chain Gana Graff,
"Keep Off the Grass," "Drop Dead" and Other Indetertninaties: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 405 (1982); Levinson, Law As Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982).
74 Levinson, supra note 63, at 1084-85.
76 Leedes, supra note 59, at 1389-90.
76 Levinson, supra note 63, at 1084-85.
" Graff, supra note 73, at 410; see also Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 73; Moore, supra note 1.
76 G. Gorruaa, THE Lome or CHOICE 91-104 (1968). Dworkin addresses this issue throughout
his work, clarifying that the perspective of his interpretive theory is neither the meaning of particular
words nor the intentions of the law creators. Rather, his perspective is broadly contextual and
inclusive of moral ideas.
79 Id. See also Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REV. 384 (1945).
80 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
81 Unger writes:
[Liberalism] states that there is nothing in any piece of knowledge that cannot be
analyzed back into the elementary sensations or ideas from which it was composed
and then built up again from those sensations and ideas. It is the principle of analysis.
Suppose we consider any aspect of our knowledge a whole whose parts are the
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central doctrine is said to flow liberal thinkers' heavy reliance on analytical reasoning
and their reluctance to conceive of humans in terms of the groups they form.
In contrast to the principle of subjective truth, which pertained to legal theory at
the level of rule or specific holding, the whole and parts doctrine pertains to legal theory
at the level of the legal system." A legal theorist who accepts the doctrine of the whole
and its parts will conceive legal systems according to one of the following two precepts:
First, that a legal system is merely a way to identify valid rules, i.e., it is a collection of
rules that in itself has no independent significance. Or, second, that a legal system forms
a harmonious, unified whole whose consistency is insured by adopting analytical reason-
ing in adjudication. In practice, the two points are very similar, but separating them here
illustrates an important distinction.
I. Legal System as a Collection of Rules
Those who believe the first version of the whole and parts doctrine deny that any
worthwhile end is served by conceiving of the legal system as anything apart from a
collection of rules and principles. Valid rules or principles gain recognition within the
legal system according to predetermined methods that can be fully described and which
determine whether a given legal proposition is, or is not, legitimately part of that system.
Moreover, the application of rules to specific factual cases proceeds within the confines
of yet other rules or canons of interpretation.
This approach to legal system is best exemplified by the theories of Hart" and the
Scandinavian Realist Karl Olivecrona." Both postulate weak "systems" of law, which are
really nothing more than collections of rules. Those rules, in turn, have little necessary
interrelationship beyond what is required to identify them as valid laws. 85 That each
writer views the legal system as lacking structure or importance reflects a highly atomized
concept of legal rule. Hart is a behaviorist, identifying rules in particular human actions,
each instance of which has little effect on other instances." Olivecrona, on the other
hand, conceives of legal rules as psychological facts, and hence "equates a legal system
with a `mass,' 'conglomerate,' [or] 'complex' of rule-ideas."" For such a structure-free,
non-interactional system it is not necessary to believe that the rules that operate within
sensations or ideas with which it is made, The principle of analysis may then be
rephrased as the proposition that in the acquisition of knowledge the whole is the sum
of its parts.
R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 46. The principle of individualism is similar: "a group is simply a
collection of individuals; in other words, the attributes of a group are the sum of the attributes of
its individual members." Id. at 81.
83 The term "legal system" is here used not to refer to the various institutions and personnel
of law, such as courts, legislatures, police, or regulatory bodies. Rather, it is meant to refer to the
internal relationships among all available legal rules, principles, and policies.
83 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 37; Note, Hart, Austin, and the Concept of
a Legal System, 84 YALE L.J. 584 (1975).
84 K. OLIVECRONA, LAW As FACT (2d ed. 1971).
" J. HARRIS, LAW AND LEGAL SCIENCE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONCEPTS "LEGAL RULE" AND
"LEGAL SYSTEM" 44-46, 54-64 (1979).
85 Id. at 63.
B' Id. at 46 (citations omitted).
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the system will be consistent or harmonious. Indeed, Olivecrona has specifically recog-
nized the possibility of contradiction within a legal system. 88
The criticism applied below to this version of the whole and parts doctrine is based
on general systems theory.99 General systems theory advocates the importance of con-
ceptualizing a separate existence of the larger system in which seemingly discrete items
are imbedded. Drawing on analogies from the natural and physical worlds, general
systems theorists have developed rich, subtle concepts of system dynamics. Before moving
to that criticism, however, the second version of the whole and parts doctrine should be
introduced.
2. Legal System as Controllable Unity
Those adopting the second version of the whole and parts doctrine are concerned
with legal system qua system, but view the internal relationships of the system components
as fully consistent, specifiable, and most importantly, controllable)" Inconsistency be-
tween aspects of the system in a given case are always seen to be resolvable by rules
granting priority to one item or the other. As one commentator described this version
of the legal system, "[t]he norms of legal reasoning are oriented toward consistency:
Many well-known 'collision-norms' demand that the lawyers do not accept incompatible
legal norms as simultaneously binding but arrange them in priority orders, for example,
according to the principle that a later statute has priority before an earlier one."92 Or,
as another stated, "[a] rational system of rules is consistent. Contradictions must be
resolved either by requiring that one rule overrides the other, as in our hierarchical
precedent system, or by limiting each rule so as to avoid the contradiction." 93
88 Id. at 48 (construing Olivecrona's summary of John Austin's legal theories in K. 01,ivEcanNA,
.supra note 84 at 33).
89 See infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., L. VON BERTALANFEY, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT,
APPLICATIONS (1968); E. LASZLO, INTuonucriox 'co SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A NEW PARA-
DIGM OF CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT (1973); R. LILIENVELD, THE RISE OF SYSTEMS THEORY: AN
IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1978); S.C. PEPPER, CONCEPT AND QUALITY — A WORLD HYPOTIIESIS (1967);
P.A. WEISS, HIERARCHICALLY ORGANIZED SYSTEMS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1971); rvlattessich, The
Systems Approach: Its Variety of Aspects, 28 GENERAL SYS.: Y.B. Soc. GENERAL SYS. RE-SEARCH 29 (1983-
84); Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 10 GENERAL Sys.: Y.B. SOG. GENERAL SYS. RESEARCH 63
(1965).
91 D'Amato, supra note 34, at 201 (summarizing the nature of the "positivist" view of legal
systems).
92 Pecezenik, Moral and Ontological Justification  of Legal Reasoning, 4 LAW & PHIL 289,292 (1985).
93 Weaver, Is A General Theory of Adjudication Possible? The Example of the PrinciplelPolicy Distinction,
48 MOD. L. REV. 613,617 (1985). Accord, Dworkin, Is Law A System of Rules? 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14,
27 (1967). The context of the remarks of both Dworkin and Weaver is in distinguishing rules from
principles. Principles are said not to have the binary, valid/invalid qualities of rules, but rather to
retain their validity even when they conflict. In such instances, each principle will have a relative
weight, which will determine the outcome of the case. Yet this refinement of the composition of
the legal system adds little sophistication to the concept of the system itself. No greater sense of
internal relationships among the various aspects of the system is assumed by the addition of the
principles. The structural distinction between principles and rules seems merely to be that they are
horn by different rules of recognition: Rules are validated within the system, principles by moral
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This view of legal system is most closely associated with the "legal science" of Hans
Kelsen" and J.W. Harris. 95 It assumes strong logical connections among the rules that
comprise a legal system, even though the rules connect more in a linear, descending
chain of validity than in a multi-dimensional "field" in which various components may
intersect in diverse ways. 96 Furthermore, this view reflects a strong assumption that the
system can be controlled perfectly, since all legitimate laws derive from authorized
individuals or agencies. Metaphorically, the law of a legal scientist is the product of a
rational will. 97
With the specification of legal content and its application firmly within rational
human control, case outcomes are harmonious and consistent, save for judicial errors
and "gaps" in the law. More ominously, however, perfect control of the system attributes
of law implies substantial and predictable potential social control." In turn, this absolutist
belief in the human controllability of a legal system may lead to defining law in terms
of such control," or analyzing and attempting to use law instrumentally as a device of
social engineering.'"
The image of a legal system developed by legal scientists contrasts strongly with that
entailed by the theories of Hart or Olivecrona. The legal scientist's legal system strictly
limits the possible valid sources of law. It assumes hierarchical relationships in such
sources, which determine the rule that will prevail in case of conflict. It also assumes
that where rules emanate from the same source, contradiction among the rules is not
possible. 101 Law creation seems disembodied from social life, a view that necessarily
accords to legal rules almost unassailable power to effect social change. It is this school
that Unger seems particularly to have in mind when he writes:
The dominant consciousness in the liberal state includes a characteristic view
of the relation between [the person] as an agent or a thinker and the external
world . . . .	 emphasizes the subjection of nature to human will as the ideal
beliefs articulated within and beyond the legal system. Farago, supra note 59, at 379. Dworkin's own
remarks on this subject are enigmatic. He states:
I did not mean, in rejecting the idea that law is a system of rules, to replace that idea
with the theory that law is a system of rules and principles. There is no such thing as
'the law' as a collection of discrete propositions, each with its own canonical form.
Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201,1256 (1977).
"See generally H. KELSON, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1946); H. KELSON, PURE
THEORY OF LAW (1967).
95. J. HARRIS, supra note 85,
‘46
 H. KELSON, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, supra note 94, esp. at 112-13.
97 Seel HARRIS, supra note 85, at 32-33; R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 19; cf. Tribe, Ways Not To
Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law,S3 YALE L.J. 1315,1327-33 (1974).
9" See D' Amato, supra note 34, at 201. See also S.F. MOORE, LAW As PROCESS: AN ANTHROPO-
LOGICAL APPROACH 1-3 (1983).
99 As one commentator describes the function of law: "law is, thus, an instrument of the
homeostasis of social co-existence .... Without proper norms this coexistence would not be possible
and there would be a situation of anarchy and/or anomy." Wroblewski, Law as an Instrument of Social
Homeostasis, 67 Archly fur Rechts–und Sozialphilosophie 1,9-10 (1981).
m See generally Summers, Pragmatic instrumentalism in Twentieth Century Legal Thought — A
Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861
(1981).
1 ° 1 J. HARRIS, supra note 85, at 10-11.
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of action and the choice of efficient means to given ends as the exemplary
procedure of reason- 1 °2
Although the following general systems theory criticism addresses primarily the first
formula of the whole and parts doctrine, the skepticism of general systems theory
concerning the human controllability of systems is also apposite to this second version.
The major criticism of the second version, however, is summarized in the following
section.'°3 Discussed there are empirical studies carried out largely by legal anthropolo-
gists, whose training and research interests better alert them to the many connections
between law and other facets of human culture.
3. Systems Theory Criticism
Formal general systems theory is a branch of philosophy devoted to uncovering the
uniform structures and behaviors of "systems." 144 In a sense it might be said to build on
notions expressed by Wittgenstein that discrete phenomena are scarcely comprehensible
except as they flow over a riverbed of background ideas.").' Virtually any natural or social
phenomenon may be analyzed as a system; all that is required to be so labelled is a set
of elements that display a continuity of interrelationships or interdependencies over
time.'"° The set of all laws within a particular jurisdiction is therefore a natural subject
for general systems analysis. The major focuses of such an inquiry would be first, to
discover the ways in which particular laws take their meaning and perform certain
functions through the influence of the collectivity of all other laws; and second, to
discover the ways in which a change in meaning or use of a particular law will change
both other particular laws and the general nature of the collective laws. 1 ° 2
Two distinctions quickly emerge between the general systems theorist's views of the
legal system, and the views that would be held by a believer in the whole and parts
1 U2 R. liNGER, supra note I, at 19.
105 See infra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
1" See supra note 90 and sources cited therein.
L05	 ON CERTAINTY (G.E.M. Anscornbe, G.H. von Wright, eds. 1974) Ludwig Wittgenstein
writes:
Sec. 141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single
proposition, it is a whole system of propositions, (Light dawns gradually over the
whole.)
Sec. 142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which
consequences and premises give one another mutual support.
Id. at 21e. See also Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157,167—
68 (1980).
100 P.A. WEISS, supra note 90, at 9-13. Weiss writes:
[A system] is not a haphazard compilation of items nor a complex of rigidly linked
pieces or events, for in either of those cases, the compilation of the total unit could
still be predicted unequivocally from the information about its constituent parts, pieced
together. In a system, ... the state of the whole must be known in order to understand
the coordination of the collective behavior of its parts; ... [it is] "control" of the
components by their collective state. The system as a whole has some characteristic
conservative configuration which is maintained, not through a rigid concatenation of
its component subunits, ... but despite the absence of such internal interlocking braces.
Id. at 13. See also Simon, supra note 90, at 63-64.
' 07 The general principles that describe how complex systems become organized to achieve
stability and unity of action are collectively known as "cybernetics." C.H. WADDINGTON, TOOLS FOR
Tnouctrr 97 (1977). See also Simon, .supra note 90, at 63.
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doctrine. The first difference in viewpoint deals with the density of relationships among
the component laws of the system, i.e., the number of ways in which each law interacts
with other laws. The second distinction deals with the authority relationships among
such laws, i.e., the extent to which the laws are structured to clarify precedence in the
event of a conflict between the component laws.
Relative to the systems theorist, the whole and parts believer holds a restricted
conception of the interrelationships of various laws. Rather than seek intricate ways in
which seemingly unrelated laws subtly affect one another, most whole and parti believers
will be quite concerned with identification features (what is, and is not, validly within
the system)'" and rules of priority within the system for resolving conflicts among the
various mutually exclusive laws. This concern with identification and priority dictates a
particular view of the authority that holds between norms in the system. To a believer
in the whole and parts doctrine, all authority relationships inevitably appear unidirec-
tional and simple. The general systems theorist, in contrast, will posit that the system is
open rather than closed, and will therefore not attempt to identify any rule of recogni-
tion. The systems theorist will not assume that one rule has consistent "authority" over
another. Rather, the view will be of mutual influence, with an authority/dominance
pattern that may change slowly, or even oscillate with rapidity.'" Since each norm is
capable of influencing every other norm, the system of rules creates a field of meaning. 110
This image may be contrasted with the linear perspective of the legal scientists, who
expect each norm to be insular except for its derivation of validity.
A third distinction is not so easily apparent, but because it concerns the concept of
a rationally controllable legal system, it is crucial to understanding the persistence of the
influence of the whole and parts doctrine on traditional concepts of legal systems. General
systems theory maintains that the interactions of system components, and therefore the
details of what a system is and how it behaves, cannot be totally controlled. According
to this theory, certain features that enable a system to sustain its identity in spite of
significant internal disruptions cannot be directed externally. These features emerge
spontaneously from the various internal interactions of the system parts."
Systems theorists carefully distinguish phenomena displayed within a self-regulating,
internally directed system, from any phenomenon that occurs through the operation of
a chain of micro-precise causes." 2 The way in which a row of dominos falls, for example,
or the way in which a cell multiplies, illustrates a chain of micro-precise sequential causes.
If even one link in the chain of causation is disturbed significantly, the process stops and
the "event" to be produced by the chain does not occur."s In contrast, a self-regulating
'" See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
1 °9 R. LILIENTELD, supra note 90, at 179; Simon, supra note 90, at 67; cf. Dworkin, Does Law
Have A Function? A Comment on the Two-level Theory of Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640 (1965).
"u R. IALIENFELD, supra note 90, at 179-81; see generally S.C. PEPPER, supra note 90; Simon,
supra note 90.
"I See supra notes 106, 109 and accompanying text.
" 2 See supra notes 106, 109 and accompanying text.
Ili Events produced by a chain of microprecise causes illustrate what Pepper has called the
"organic" hypothesis. S.C. PEPPER, WORLD HYPOTHESES: A STUDY IN EVIDENCE 232-314 (1957). The
various components of an organic structure, and their causal connections, can be precisely mapped.
A significant disturbance to the structure may so disrupt the causal chains that the structure "fails,"
i.e., collapses, or is incapable of producing a novel property. For example, the propellor shaft of
an airplane connects in precise fashion to other components. If the shaft is broken, the novel
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system also produces "events" greater than could be predicted from looking only at the
various components, but it does this in unpredictable, or in multiple, self-adapting ways.""
Various components could be disrupted significantly, but the system events still would
emerge. The causal operations producing the event, however, may have had to be
changed by intricate internal adjustments among many system components. US Examples
of a phenomenon produced by a self-regulating system are the way the price of a
commodity emerges in a free market systen ► ,"" or the way the molecules of a liquid
arrange themselves within a container," 7 or the emergence of consciousness from a
human brain. Although little is known of such processes, it is likely that they involve
substantial structural redundancies that are capable, when needed, of offsetting one
another in an appropriate fashion, rather than always working in complement. This is
a fashioning of component interaction that is highly flexible and adaptive to circum-
stance, but not a fashioning that is unified, consistent, harmonious, or even necessarily
"rational."
Looking at legal systems through the eyes of a general systems theorist, therefore,
would create much skepticism about certain whole and parts presumptions of clear,
controllable, top-down authority patterns; about closed, non-contradictory, rational, and
orderly structures; and about the possibility of outcome precision in particular cases.H 9
The impact of systems thinking on legal philosophy is not, however, wholly negative.
Seeing the legal system as self-regulating might encourage greatly our faith in its ability
to achieve just results, even in the face of conflicting desirable principles or rapid social
change.
4. Empirical Criticism of the Efficacy and Controllability of Law
In addition to the conceptual criticism of the whole and parts doctrine that emerges
from using the perspective of general systems theory to understand law, empirical
evidence of the inconsistency, disharmony, and lack of efficacy of legal systems can also
be offered to dispute the whole and parts doctrine, especially in response to the "legal
scientists— version that is dominated by beliefs about the precision, clarity, order, ration-
ality, and efficacy of rules." 9
property of an airplane, i.e., the ability to fly, fails to emerge. See id. at 300. In a true system,
however, the result of a significant structural disruption is a series of subtle modifications in the
relationships among the various components, so as to assure the persistence of the structure and
its major operations. See R. LILIENFELD, supra note 90, at 11-12; P.A. WEISS, supra note 90, at 13-
14.
I " See infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text. See also McNeill, Sentences as Biological Systems,
in P.A. WEtss, supra note 90, at 59-68.
'[e See M. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 174-200 (1951).
M. at 160-61.
117 1d. at 155.
see Dienes, Judges, Legislators, and Social Change, 13 AMER. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 553
(1970), in which the author, although advocating a general systems philosophy, also presumes that
full knowledge of systems interaction will empower the conscious manipulation of' the systems. See
also Forrester, Behavior of Social Systems, in P.A. WEISS, supra note 90, at 81-122. I remain skeptical,
however, that in any social setting the various interactions can be mapped with sufficient precision
to permit human manipulation.
II9 See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
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Based on her studies of preindustrial societies, the legal anthropologist Sally Falk
mooreau disputes that either the aggregate of legal systems, or by implication any
particular system, can be fully successful in organizing and controlling human behav-
ior. 12 ' She states:
The social reality is a peculiar mix of action congruent with rules (and there
may be numerous conflicting or competing rule-orders) and other action
that is choice-making, discretionary, manipulative, sometimes inconsistent,
and sometimes conflictual .... Hence it is inherent in the nature of legal
systems that they can never become fully coherent, consistent wholes which
successfully regulate all of social life.' 22
Even more pointedly she declares, "[t]he making of rules and social and symbolic order
is a human industry matched only by the manipulation, circumvention, remaking, re-
placing, and unmaking of rules and symbols in which people seem almost equally
engaged."'" The power and efficacy of legal rules thus appears attenuated, when viewed
within the context of social life.
Fieldwork in India prompted Marc Galanter to reach a similar conclusion:
Our model of modern law emphasizes its unity, uniformity, and universality.
Our model pictures a machinery for the relentless imposition of prevailing
central rules and procedures over all that is local and parochial and deviant.
But no actual legal system is really so unified, regular, and universalistic. [In
every legal system there are] sources of diversity, variety, irregularity, and
particularism . — 124
The indeterminedness inherent in legal systems can be said to arise from at least four
sources. First, the primary material of a legal system is a rule, about which James B.
White has said: "There is a sense in which the very structure or syntax of the rule —
the way it works — makes it a radically fictional expression." 125 This "fiction" of legal
rules is said to be due to several unrealistic and inaccurate characteristics of those rules:
they reduce all that can be said about an event to a binary yes/no conclusion;' 26 they
work by a labelling or naming process that masks complexity;'" they assume that the
120 S.F. MOORE, supra note 98.
121 Id. at 1-4, 54-81.
122 Id, at 3. On a broader level she writes:
[lit is useful to conceive an underlying, theoretically absolute cultural and social
indeterminacy, which is only partially done away with by culture and organized social
life, the patterned aspects of which are temporary, incomplete, and contain elements
of inconsistency, ambiguity, discontinuity, contradiction, paradox, and conflict ....
Even in matters where there are rules and customs socially and culturally generated,
indeterminacy may be produced by the manipulation of existing internal contradic-
tions, inconsistencies, and ambiguities within the universe of relatively determinate
elements.
Id. at 49.
123 Id. at
124 Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH 153,157
(M. Weiner ed. 1966).
' 20 1 WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 228 (1973).
126 Id.
' 2 ' Id.
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labels are consistent and always mean the same thing; 128 and finally, the rules operate at
a compromising and inaccurate level of generality "between the specific command and
the vague ideal." 129
The second major source of system inconsistency is the method by which legal
systems are constructed, which Moore labels "piecemeal alterations over time, accretion
and doctrinal synthesis."'" Legal creation does not occur as part of an ongoing systematic
conception of law; rather, it arises as discrete responses to "particular circumstances at
particular moments," leading to an "unplanned total result." 3 '
A variation on this theme that has been argued by several writers is the arbitrariness
by which rules are selected. Niklas Luhmann, 132 for example, maintains' that the specific
content of many social rules is not dictated so much by policy as by dominant personalities
advocating a certain position, or by lack of understanding of problems and alternative
solutions, or by concealment of the persistence of dissenting positions to that taken in
the rule.'" Also contributing to imperfect control over the selection of rules for inclusion
in the system are the multiple sources of rule-generation that anthropologists tend to
identify,'" even if positivists do not.'"
The final reason for doubting the harmony and consistency of decisional outcomes
from any legal system is simply that the law as written is often not the law that is
applied.'" This phenomenon is virtually self-evident, and again the sources of the
indeterminacy are several: legal decisional and enforcement agencies overlap in juris-
diction, many legal system personnel may be subject to local political pressures, and "the
necessity of accommodating values and interests that are not explicitly acknowledged by
the legal system."'" This incongruence between formal law and law as acted out in the
society was a major impetus of the Realist movement, with its methodological focus on
specific disputes and actual judicial resolutions.'"
128 Id. at 228-29; see also Fuller, supra note 49; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, supra note 37; Williams, supra note 79, at 400-04; cf. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE
Lj. 1311,1316 (1969).
129j. WHITE, supra note 125, at 229.
'" S.F. MOORE, supra note 98, at 9.
131 Id,
"2 N. LUHMANN, A SocioLocicAL THEORY OF LAw (E. King and M. Albrow trans. 1985).
133 id. at 55. Or as stated by another commentator: "the historical approach introduces the
element of irreverence ... for it shows by what absurd shifts and accidents much of the law has
been arrived at ...." A. HARDING, A SOCIAL. HISTORY or ENGLISH LAw 8 (1966), quoted in S.F.
MOORE, supra note 98, at 9.
14 S.F. MOORE, supra note 98, at 13-31.
"3 But see J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
LEGAL SYSTEM (1970), in which he discusses the possibility of multiple rules of recognition.
136 Calanter, supra note 124; see also E.A. HOEIIEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 30 (1954); S.F.
MOORE, supra note 98.
17 Galanter, supra note 124, at 157-59. In modern legal systems, says Galanter,
Illarochial interests and concerns find expression in new ways. Federalism, limitations
on government, rules of contract, and voluntary association all provide enclaves;
Devices like juries, and locally elected judges and prosecutors, permit differences
under the veneer of uniformity. Selective nonenforcement, planned inefficiency, sub
rosa compromise, tolerated evasion, and, finally, corruption — all these permit the
local, the particularist, the deviant, to assert themselves while maintaining the fiction
that the law is uniform and unvarying.
Id. at 163.
18 See E.A. HOEBEL, supra note 136, at 29-45.
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C. Conclusions
The doctrine of the whole and its parts is a proposition distinct from the principle
of subjective truth, and it is possible to hold one belief without holding the other.
Nonetheless, in the doctrines of legal theory to which each proposition have given birth,
the two views are mutually reinforcing. First, the system assumptions of rationality and
complete control of legal outcomes make more plausible the notion that single right
answers are available in particular cases. Conversely, modern single answer theories must
take their precise answers from humanly created sources. Finding such answers seems
far less mystical where the answers can be asserted to lie embedded in a unified and
harmonious system.
Perhaps because comparatively little research has been devoted to analyzing legal
systems, the grip of the whole and parts doctrine over contemporary legal thought is
probably even stronger than the influence of the subjective truth theory. Nonetheless,
the whole and parts doctrine is less defensible. It depends on a mechanistic metaphor
that was long ago abandoned in the natural sciences. As shall be explored below," the
failing of Linger and Tushnet is ironically traceable to their inability to transcend the
very whole and the parts approach they criticize.
II. ARE UNGER'S Two EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES NECESSARY BELIEFS OF
LIBERALISM?
As suggested above,"° belief in the atomization of truth has led to some labored
theorizing to find a reconciliation with core liberal goals. The effort has been largely
unsuccessful, and this arguably has lessened the effectiveness of the various liberal
theories of adjudication. Much the same disruption and confusion in the formulation of
coherent legal and political philosophy has resulted from embracing the doctrine of the
whole and its parts. However, are such efforts at reconciliation necessary? What, if
anything, in the foundations of liberal thought compels allegiance to these epistemolog-
ical principles? In the paragraphs below, Unger's construction of liberalism is examined
critically. It is submitted that neither the principle of subjective truth, not the doctrine
of the whole and its parts, is a necessary belief of liberals. Moreover, not all liberals have
embraced either proposition.
Unger derives liberal attributes through tight logic. Yet the logic is also highly
vulnerable to refutation, since each new premise is based on a previous conclusion."'
The cornerstone of his theory is the doctrine of intelligible essences and the alleged
liberal opposition to that doctrine. From this assertion follows deductively the conclusion
that liberals deny that ethical values might "exist" in some sense apart from the purely
personal preferences of discrete individuals. And from that conclusion it follows that
liberals would deny the legitimacy of injecting external ethical values into Constitutional
litigation.
Unger offers thin proof that belief in subjective truth is a distinguishing character-
istic of liberalism. He cites only Hobbes to support his clairn, 142 yet in another citation
concedes that Locke, and many liberals succeeding Locke, have rejected the concept of
L" See infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
"° See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
14 ' R. UNGER, Supra note I, at 13-16, 115-18.
142 Id. at 306 nn.14-15.
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subjective truth.'" Hobbes certainly was part of the skeptical, secular movement, but
few liberals would acknowledge him as an intellectual ancestor.'" Basically, Hobbes very
unliberally advocated an all-powerful sovereign with unconstrained authority." 5
Hobbes's intent in advocating a subjective theory was not the atomization of truth, but
rather, merely the redirection of its source from the Church to the State. 146 If subsequent
liberals developed a deontological philosophy as Unger suggests, it was in the context of
supporting the protection of individual rights and expression, rather than freeing the
monarch from Church authority. 147 Both historically and logically, therefore, Unger's
case tying liberalism to the subjective theory of truth is problematic.
There is actually no reason to suppose that liberals embrace the subjective theory
of truth, apart from their commonly held Kantian view that individuals are free, inde-
pendent, moral agents. 148 Kantian humanism, however, does not logically entail the
subjective truth proposition.'" The existence of external values embraced by a culture
does not differ epistemologically from the existence of mundane empirical properties.
For example, the reality of a table does not cause anyone to say that the individual
perceiving the table, and making a judgment to avoid walking into the table, has somehow
been deprived of the freedom of individual judgment. Similarly, the existence of cultural
values that exist apart from particular personal choices of individuals, does not deprive an
individual of a free moral judgment about those cultural values. Individual judgment is always
based on information, whether that information is perceptible to the senses, or only to
the mind. No proposition of Kant requires that this information not exist. On the
contrary, the notion of free moral choice is spiritually empty sinless some information
exists external to the individual self. 15" Individuals ultimately may or may not observe
these external values, or may rank the importanCe of various values in highly disparate
ways, but these propositions differ from the claim that liberalism entails the principle of
subjective truth.
An entirely different type of refutation of the Unger/Tushnet description of liber-
alism is to examine the philosophy as a social fact, rather than as the set of ideas by
which the two authors define liberalism. Liberals have, for example, simultaneously
i43 id. at 301 n.188. Unger states:
There is a recurring tendency in the history of liberal thought to attempt to escape
from the principle of arbitrary desire by reverting to a doctrine of intelligible mural
essences. The advocates of the reversion characteristically try to perpetuate the doc-
trine without accepting its bases in more general ideas about thought and language.
Moreover, they want to admit some of the consequences and to reject others. They
therefore fall into all incoherent eclecticism.
Id. (citation omitted). Unger further describes how Kant and Spinoza "attempt to accommodate
some version of intelligible essences," id, at 297 n.1, and that only Hobbes and Mill "reject the
classical doctrine outright by developing a nominalist conception of essences." Id. at 297-98 nn.1—
2. The issue is whether particular liberals have fallen into "incoherent eclecticism" or, rather,
whether Unger has simply mislabelled liberalism. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text.
'" D.J. MANNING, supra note 16, at 34.
' 45
 Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 1, at 783.
146 H. LASKI, supra note IS, at 12, 105, 118, 119, 127.
17 J.H. HALLOWELL, supra note 15, at 21-22,
"'See G. DIETZE, supra note 15, at 136-43.
119 Contra M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982), in which the subjective
truth proposition is well argued in the context of Mill and Rawls.
10 A. RYAN, supra note 16, at 75; cf. M. SANDEL, supra note 149, at 117-18.
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opposed the doctrine of intelligible essences (or "essentialism" in more modern terms),
yet vigorously advocated the existence of certain timeless,, fundamental human values.
A case in point is Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies. ' 5 ' Written during World
War II, the book is almost literally a call to arms in defense of the liberal principles of
reason, liberty, and piecemeal democratic solutions. 152 In the same work, however, es-
sentialism is bitterly attacked as antirational, leading inevitably to mysticism or Scholastic
stultification.'" Simultaneously holding these two positions may well be logically incon-
sistent, but that prevents neither its occurrence, nor the fact that both doctrines are
legitimately associated with liberalism; nor, finally, does its strict logical incoherence
impair the political and intellectual power of Popper's arguments.
More recently, those Constitutional scholars that Henry Monaghan refers to as "due
substance theorists"I 54 display, within a liberal tradition, a willingness to specify particular
substantive values which adjudication affirmatively should further. These values are not
conceived solely as individual rights, but rather as general social aims. Monaghan writes
disapprovingly:
[O]ne cannot read the works of Professors Tribe, Karst, Michaelman, and a
whole host of other due substance theorists without a profound feeling that,
however much they might otherwise disagree, for them the constitution is
essentially perfect in one central respect: properly construed, the constitution
guarantees against the political order most equality and autonomy values which the
commentators think a twentieth century Western liberal democratic government ought
to guarantee its citizens. For these commentators ... a necessary link is asserted
between the constitution and currently valid notions of rights, equality and
distributive justice. 155
These two types of refutations of the Unger/Tushnet descriptions of liberalism, one
based on questioning the premises used in deducing liberal attributes, the other based
on viewing liberalism as a social event rather than as a set of ideas, could be repeated in
the context of the doctrine of the whole and its parts. Certainly liberalism grew histori-
cally alongside the belief in reason as the proper method of gaining knowledge about
the world. Certainly also many liberals adopt analytical reasoning in their approach to
problem solving, and this tendency reinforces an outlook of the world that oversimplifies
complex, elusive phenomena. But this "principle of analysis" by which liberals are said
in part to be described also rests on the premise that they must embrace such a principle
if they oppose the doctrine of intelligible essences.
Moreover, it is not clear that all, or even most liberals, accept the basic reductionist
analytical method for apprehending the world. For example, many contemporary legal
and constitutional theorists stress the "process values" of fairness, participation, privacy,
and reasoned decisional justification that emerge from the specified procedures of ad-
L" 2 K. POPPER, supra note 19.
I" I K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES; THE SPELL OF PLATO 11111, 1-4 (5th ed.)
(1966).
153 /d. at 10-21.
154 Monaghan, supra note 35, at 357; see also Brest, supra note 35; Murphy, An Ordering of
Constitutional Values, 53 So. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980).
' 55 Monaghan, supra note 35, at 358.
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judication.'" Implicitly these liberals comprehend legal systems in a way that rejects the
doctrine of the whole and its parts, and indeed that resembles the doctrine of intelligible
essences. Certain properties that exist only by operation of the whole — here the process
values — are evaluated for their own qualities, apart from their instrumental value in
achieving good results. 157
At a higher level of abstraction, some legal philosophers have approached legal
systems as would a general systems theorist. 1 " Only rarely is the terminology used, but
the idea of a legal system displaying not only emergent properties, but also "qualities"
that assure its own continuation is traceable throughout modern legal thought. Dworkin,
for example, alludes to certain legal maxims that express these qualities: "Law works
itself pure;" "Law has its own ambitions;" "There is a higher law, written and yet beyond
positive law, toward which positive law grows."'"
A few contemporary theorists have openly embraced the general systems view of a
legal system with dynamic, self-controlling properties)" Niklas Luhmann has developed
this position most elaborately, although without using the terminology of formal systems
theory. 161 Anthony D'Amato is explicit when he contrasts the positivist view of a legal
system with the general systems-based alternative that he terms "naturalist." 162 He argues
that a positivist views the legal system as an externally imposed control mechanism, while
the naturalist views the legal system as beyond total human control:
[A] positivist view of a legal system is something that we invent (by specifi-
cation) to control people who would, absent the legal system, be unable to
control themselves
In contrast, naturalist theory would not call for any a priori designation
of entities that must be controlled or the installation of machinery to effec-
tuate control.
I" See, e.g., Christie, supra note 128; J.H. ELY, supra note 35; Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353,381-93 (1978); Monaghan, supra note 35; Summers, Evaluating
and Improving Legal Processes — A Plea for 'Process Values', 60 CORNELL L. REV, 1 (1974). ln criticizing
the proceduralists, Tribe summarizes their position as similar to one often taken by the Supreme
Court itself:
In deciding constitutional cases, the Supreme Court has often invoked a vision of how
politics should work, justifying judicial intervention as a response to supposed gaps
between that vision and political reality. Legislation or other governmental action is of
constitutional concern, the Court suggests, when it seems to obstruct political repre-
sentation and accountability — by blocking speech or voting, for example — or when
it reveals the existence of past or present obstructions — by distributing the law's
benefits and burdens in ways that show a particular group to have been denied fair
representation.
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063,1063 (1980).
See also the criticism of process-based theories articulated in PARKER, supra note 1.
I " See Summers, supra note 156;	 Christie, .supra note 128, at 14213-41; Fuller, supra note
156, at 381-93.
'" See supra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
1 " Dworkin, supra note 39, at 173.
'a° See N. LUuMANN, supra note 132; see also D'Amato, supra note 34; Goldman and Jahnige,
Eastonian Systems Analysis and Legal Research, 2 Ru-r.-CAM. Lj. 285 (1970); Lewis, Systems Theory and
Judicial Behaviorism, 21 CASE W. Res. 361 (1970); Raab, Suggestions for a Cybernetic Approach to
Sociological Jurisprudence, 17 J.L. En. 397 (1965); Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J.L.
Srun. 125 (1971); Sigler, A Cybernetic Model of the Judicial System, 41 TEAP. L.Q. 398 (1968).
16 ' N. Luhmann, supra note 132.
" D'Amato, supra note 34, at 192 ff.
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Under naturalist theory, a society's legal system controls itself . . . [R]eal-
world variety . . . cannot be handled by a smaller control system (as in the
positivist model), [it] can only be regulated by the system itself . . . . 163
This concept of the legal system as self-controlling, and therefore exercising powerful
internal constraints on the potential effects of judicial indiscretion or majoritarian usur-
pation, is considered in greater detail below. 164
 First, however, the criticisms of Unger's
propositions about liberal epistemology may be summarized.
In his methodology, Unger has mimicked his own stereotype of liberalism. He offers
a brilliant but ultimately rationalistic argument that breaks down liberalism into closely
working component parts. He thereby denies that liberalism might represent a number
of diverse, inconsistent or openly contradictory propositions that change constantly in
mixture.'" He thereby denies also that liberalism might have immanent qualities,
whereby the whole is not completely specifiable by decomposition.' 66
An equally serious methodological problem, and one that yet more clearly reveals
an examiner captured by his vision of the things examined, is Unger's use of self-
contained, mutually exclusive analytical categories. Here it is worth recalling Popper's
observation that "essences" are often merely elaborate definitions used as irrefutable
premises from which non-falsifiable, unscientific deductions are made. 167 Unger creates,
and uses for deductive purposes, such brittle oppositions as "objective/subjective" and
"individual/communal." 168
 Liberalism, concludes Unger, is an example of the pairing of
"subjective" with "individual."'" By implication, liberalism possesses nothing of the op-
posing qualities of "objective" or "communal." Unger's various propositions about lib-
eralism follow deductively from this binary characterization.'" But surely a social phi-
losophy as comprehensive as liberalism cannot be represented accurately in the boxes
created by such matrices.' 71 One may legitimately ask: is there no middle ground between
165 Id. at 201-202.
'61
	 infra notes 176-219 and accompanying text.
166 Unger's assumptions about the unity and coherence of liberalism affect how he treats ideas
partially inconsistent with this unified view. Where evidence is Uncovered of a theory that accepts
one aspect of Unger's model of liberalism, but appears to reject other aspects of the model, the
theory is labelled "partial criticism" rather than seen as evidence that the asserted clumping of
attributes cannot hold.
166 See, e.g., id., at 4-10; 125-33; 301 n.18. This fundamental defect is apparent to Unger. With
commendable intellectual honesty he describes the constrained rationality and limited set of patterns
by which he is able to approach his subject. R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 15-16,115-19. He attributes
the intellectual grip of this narrow world perspective to the intensity of liberal culture, and despairs
of transcending it. Id. at 118. Yet by identifying the shortcomings of his own theory, he also reveals
the wide-ranging influence of this same defect in contemporary theories of adjudication within the
liberal tradition. This in turn points the way to a better understanding of the strengths and failures
of those theories.
167 K. POPPER, supra note 19, at 10-12.
' 68 R. UNGER, supra note I, at 76.
169 1d. at 76-77.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
Unger himself has displayed frustration at the channelling of thought that follows from
rigid categorization quite similar to that offered now by him. Discussing the impoverished meth-
odological choices available to the scholar where the world is tightly divided between "events"
(occurrences for which humans are not responsible) or "acts," (occurrences that are humanly willed)
Unger asks, "is it true that we must choose between a belief that propositions are reciprocally
entailed and the view that they are unrelated?" R. UNGER, supra note I, at 13.
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objective and subjective, as the terms are used by Unger? Is it not possible to describe
ideas that are neither "objective" in Unger's sense of being beyond human power to
affect, 172 nor the product of direct consciousness, which is the import of Unger's definition
of "subjective"?'" Similarly, is there no middle ground between "individual" ends, i.e.,
"the objectives of particular individuals" and "communal values" which is "understood
as the aims of groups"?'" The following section addresses these questions in response
to the Unger/Tushnet claim that it is only through the creation of communal values that
the seemingly inconsistent goals of majoritarian and judicial control can be resolved.'"
III. IS UNIFORMITY THE ONLY ANSWER?
This section argues that there is indeed a middle ground between "objective" and
"subjective," and between "individual" and "communal,"'" and that the middle ground
is reached by shifting the inquiry away from issues of human control and controlling
humans, to inquiries about the legal system itself.' 77 The discussion focuses on the legal
system as a highly evolved procedure for problem-solving, thereby revealing the limited
feasibility of majoritarian despotism. Similarly, the following discussion argues that seeing
the legal system as "shared meanings" may resolve much of the traditional liberal concern
about possible judicial anarchy.
The liberal legal system, with all its conflict, disharmony, incoherence and unpre-
dictability, provides an effective alternative to Tushnet's advocacy of uniform moral
values. The desired constraints on legislators and judges alike spring from two sources
within legal systems: first, the procedures of adjudication itself, in which general rules
and principles are applied to specific human contexts; and second, the broad language
of the legal system, which shapes both law's possible meanings and the method of
expressing such possibilities. Viewed from this perspective, the issues of the subjectivity
of truth and value-free adjudication are of limited importance. The constraints here
identified are internal, not external. To he sure, the constraints are not perfect and
could be supplemented profitably by specifying values such as those advocated by the
"due substance theorists."'" To so advocate is not inconsistent with liberalism, but neither
is it unliheral to prefer that the internal constraints be more weakly supplemented by
the notion of "rights" as advocated by Dworkin, or even to prefer some version of value-
free adjudication. This latter alternative, however, leads to a less dynamic and, in the
opinion of the Author, less desirable concept of adjudication.
A. The Legal System as an Evolved Method of Problem-Solving
The first source of internal constraint is found in the structural differences between
legislative and adjudicatory decisionmaking. For Dworkin, this difference represents the
178 Unger defines "objective values" as "standards and goals of conduct that exist independently
of human choice," Id. at 76.
179
	
Unger states, "[vialues are subjective in the sense that they are determined by choice.
Subjectivity emphasizes that an end is an end simply because someone holds it .. . ." Id.
174 Id.
178 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
176 Cf. Bennett, supra note 31, at 452,491.
177 This is the approach taken by those legal theorists who have embraced the general systems
methodology. See citations at supra note 160; see also Barton, Expectations, Institutions, and Meanings:
A Review of Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (1986).
178 See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
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distinction between policy and principles; that is, legislatures should determine and
implement social goals based on utilitarian grounds while courts should determine
individual rights based on non-utilitarian grounds.'" Dworkin argues that the proper
liberal system is achieved when each branch confines its decisionmaking within these
respective constraints. Creating this distinction is a way for Dworkin to argue that the
legislatures should not usurp judicial functions, but he fails to convince that such usur-
pation is impossible.'"
Dworkin's argument takes on much greater force when adjudication and legislation
are each viewed as bundles of distinct procedures by which particular sorts of problems
may be solved. For example, if a certain type of problem chronically exists, and if only
the procedure of adjudication can cope efficaciously with that sort of problem, then an
indispensable role for adjudication also exists. As D'Amato suggests, even if a legislature
were to attempt to usurp such role, it could do so only by resorting to the procedures
used by adjudication.'" In practical effect, this would greatly limit the intended usur-
pation. Legislatures could eliminate the functions of courts only by themselves devising
new procedures that would function adjudicatively.' 82 The converse would also be true.
If certain sorts of problems can be solved only through techniques available to legislators,
then that fact functionally constrains the degree to which a judicial system could control
legislation.
This internal constraint has liberal roots. The checks and balances of government
so carefully conceived by Montesquieu and Jefferson were institutional, but after two
hundred years of evolution, formal institutional checks and balances have been supple-
mented by the problem-solving specialization that has developed in each respective
institution. Although continuing liberal fears of majoritarian despotism are not baseless,
as a practical matter legislative tyranny is difficult to effectuate because there simply is
not a high degree of possible human control over this interaction of problems and their
method of solution. Through their very operation, liberal institutions, once perhaps delicate,
are slowly removing themselves from the possibility of human tampering.
The sorts of problems that are exclusively solvable, or at least far more efficiently
solvable, through the procedures of adjudication rather than procedures of legislation' 83
"9 R. Dwcautztv, supra note 46, at 82-88; see also Richards supra note 62, at 1307-11.
180 Some critics also have questioned whether logically this distinction can be maintained. See,
e.g., Weaver, supra note 93. Others dispute that a judge's role can be dissected so neatly into the
two types of reasons, or that such a bifurcation is either appropriate or desirable. See, e.g., Green-
awalt, supra note 45.
Finally, Levinson incisively describes an ironic sort of moral trivialization that may follow from
single case absolutism. Levinson, supra note 63, at 1090-91. Dworkin's thesis, he states, conflates
law and morality. In so doing, it obscures "the presence of tragedy in history, when 'conscientious'
judges are called upon to enforce legally valid, though morally iniquitous, acts." Id. at 1090. Dworkin
would deny, for example, that there was really a dilemma for abolitionist judges on the issue of
slavery. He would posit that the judges who struggled so intensely with their perceived conflict
between professional responsibility and personal morality were not heroic, but rather were merely
judicially unperceptive. Id. at 1090-91 (discussing Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers, TIIE TIMES
(London) LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 5, 1978, at 1437, col. 5.).
181 D'Amato, supra note 34, at 191-92.
182 Id.
185
	 generally Barton, Common Law and Its Substitutes: The Allocation of Social Problems to Alter-
native Decisional Institutions, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 519 (1985) [hereinafter Common Law and Its Substitutes];
Barton, Justiciability: A Theory of Judicial Problem Solving; 24 B.C.L. REV. 505 (1983) [hereinafter
Justiciability]; Richards, supra note 62, at 1311-12.
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might be structurally described along three dimensions. First, such problems are not
future-directed, either in the sense of predicting some future event or achieving some
goal; 184 second, the problems may require making fine distinctions of worthiness or
desert among particular individuals; 1 " and finally, the problems are highly complex,
being comprised of many interacting variables.' 8"
Professor D'Amato has a strong vision of the importance of the first of these
dimensions. 187 The distinction between a problem that is historical, and one that can be
prevented or shaped as it unfolds in the future, illustrates a systemic constraint on the
feasibility of legislative usurpation of the judicial role (and, although he does not discuss
it, the converse judicial usurpation of the legislative role). He comes to this insight
through his use of general systems theory.'" A "cornerstone of cybernetic theory," he
explains, is Ashby's "Law of Requisite Variety," summarized in the phrase, "only variety
can destroy variety."'" That is, flexibility in outcome or in structure of. problem-solving
procedures is required to resolve problems that make various demands. Based on that
principle, D'Amato derives the following:
The only way to control a situation, Ashby shows, is for the controller to
have as much variety as the controlled. From the viewpoint of the legislature,
the future of the real world has infinite variety and therefore can never be
controlled in the legislative present by means of a finite number of statutory
words. However, if we have a body that makes decisions relating to past
actions, such a body will have the requisite variety to decide the cages so long
as they are decided one at a time. This body [is] a 'court' . . The past is
something that has been uniquely determined; the future consists of an
infinite set of possibilities. The only way a legislature could completely control
a court is to turn itself into a court. However, even if that happened . we
could still speak of the combined body as at times functioning as a legislature
(when making prospective rules) and at times functioning as a court (when
deciding retrospectively), even if some of these instances overlap."
Positivists such as Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin were presumptuous in thinking that
the system procedures can be fully specified in advance, "so that the legal system simply
follows ... verbal commands in coping with real-world variety .. . . [T]heoretically such
a priori specification is impossible. Real-world variety outstrips the ability of language to
contain it."'" Examples of problems that are exclusively historical, and therefore virtually
impossible to be solved legislatively, include the administration of the criminal law and
the monitoring of compliance with any governmental regulatory or planning policies.
The second structural aspect of problems that, if present, requires resolution by
adjudicative procedures, is the need to make fine discriminations among factual contexts,
1" See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
188 See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
186 See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
1 " D'Amato, supra note 34, at 190-92. See also Barton, Justiciability, supra note 183, at 512,533,
539-40,579-88.
188 See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
163 D'Amato, supra note 34, at 191 11.25 (quoting Asimv, AN INTRODUCTION To CYBERNETICS
207 (1956)).
," Id. at 191-92.
191 Id. at 199-200.
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particularly those involving issues of individual psychology or individual moral worth. 02
Adjudication can be a highly personal inquiry because it solves general problems incre-
mentally and in a decentralized fashion. Legislation, in contrast, solves problems by
making far fewer "decisions" — often only one — and these are based on general
evidence. In its ability to make particularized inquiries, courts therefore are well-
equipped to solve problems containing factual nuances of great subtlety.'" Moreover,
adjudication is superior to legislation in resolving problems that demand personal par-
ticipation by the problem-holders.'" Thus, problems that turn on understanding human
relationships or human psychology, or that require determinations of human intention-
ality, will elude solution by legislative procedures.' 95
Finally, the decentralized, incremental decisional structure of adjudication is well
suited to solving problems of a particular level of complexity.'" The common law can
display the "spontaneous" rationality, as opposed to the "deliberative" controlling ration-
ality used by legislatures, required where the only possible efficacious solution to a
problem is one that requires hundreds of small adjustments over time, by individuals
differently placed.' 97 In this sense adjudication resembles the decisionmaking of the
marketplace, whereby the "solutions" of problems such as price, supply allocation, and
appropriate production level are resolved without conscious planning from a central
source. 198 Although adjudication cannot cope with problems of that complexity, it none-
theless offers a vital "middle way" alternative for problems beyond the capabilities of
central direction, but where some intrusion of human control is thought indispensable.
For example, adjudication is more appropriate than other decisional institutions in
solving a problem of such nuance and complexity as the fashioning of a healthy, multi-
racial society.'"
A fair objection may be raised at this point that the above arguments concerning
the structural constraints on majoritarian despotism do nothing to prevent exactly the
sort of usurpation that has always centrally concerned liberals: minority group oppres-
sion, confiscation of property, and limitation of civil rights. Rather, the structural con-
straints prevent only usurpation of the function of judging the right and wrong of
individual behavior, or attempts by legislatures to make subtle distinctions in factual
192 One sense of this is suggested by Thomas Cowan: "[LJaw is highly skilled in making value
judgments, or ...feeling-ualuejudgments. By 'feeling' ... 1 mean the process by which the distinctive
worth of an individual is brought into view," Cowan, Decision Theory in Law, Science and Technology,
17 RUTGERS L. REV. 499, 501 (1963).
J" As stated in Regan, Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1213,
1263 (1978): "[W]e think [judges] are better suited than legislatures to engage in the careful parsing
of relatively bounded dispute situations, repetitive in their general outlines but infinitely variable
in detail, which these methods require."
194 See generally Barton, Common Law and Its Substitutes, supra note 183, at 528-31; Eisenberg,
Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410
(1978); Fuller, supra note 156.
to Barton, Common Law and Its Substitutes, supra note 183, at 529, 531,
196 Id. at 523-28.
See 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 2, 8-21, 33, 141-44 (1973); M. POLANYI,
supra note 115, at 154-56; Fuller, supra note 156, at 394; Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 3 (1960); see also supra notes
112-18 and accompanying text.
I " M. POLANYI, supra note 115, at 160-65; cf. Fuller, supra note 156, at 398.
199 See Barton, Common Law and Its Substitutes, supra note 183, at 524.
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settings. The judiciary's power of implementation and interpretation in particular set-
tings, however, also serves as a constraint on what legislatures can accomplish. Social
behavior frequently is far removed from the dictates of formal law. 2" As Sally Falk
Moore has demonstrated, 201 unless legislative imperatives are embraced by more localized
cultural institutions and officials, such as local judges, the effects of the legislation may
be minimal or even contrary to that intended. This concept is a corollary of conceiving
of the legal system as in some ways beyond perfect human control.
Nonetheless, it must he conceded that without something more, the structural de-
mands of problems will not fully prevent majoritarian despotism. When supplemented
by the existence of a constitution and the institution of judicial review, however, those
• sorts of possible abuses less affected by the "problem-solving" constraints are subject to
another constraint. As shall be developed below,'" judicial review in itself forces all
legislation to join a pool of shared, highly developed linguistic meaning. The more
refined this pool, the more difficult it is for particular legislation, or for particular judges,
to circumvent its fundamental premises.
B. Law as a System of Shared Meaning
The linguistically-inspired criticisms of legal positivism and formalism have raised
serious doubts as to the ability of language to convey particular, controllable meanings. 2"
The converse of this proposition, however, is that language exerts cultural power over
those who use it. Whitehead, for exarnple, maintained that the practical boundary of
thought was that which could be spoken. 2 "4 There can be no doubt that law is a highly
elaborate and specialized meaning system — so much so that it is largely inaccessible to
those not trained in 4. 2" In a sense, this density of meaning captures the imagination,
and places great constraints on the ease with which one can escape, or change funda-
mentally, that system.
Several writers have described this phenomenon, although most do so in rather
vague terms about tradition or continuity. 206 A more complete description of these
2°° See supra note 136-38 and accompanying text.
2°' S.F. MOORE, supra note 98, at 54-78.
"2 See infra notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
2°5 See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 34, at 189; Moore, supra note 1. As Unger writes:
The formalist believes that words usually have clear meanings. He adopts, in one
mode or another, Augustine's view of language as a series of names that point to
things.	 The chief vice of formalism is its dependence on a view of language that
cannot be reconciled with the modern ideas of science, nature, and language that
formalists themselves take for granted.
R. UNGER, supra note 1, at ,92,94.
2" A.N. WHITEHEAD, MODES or Ttioucurr 46-99 (1958).
"5 Cf. N. LUHMANN, supra note 132, at 2.
20° Professor Bennett, for example, writes:
The legitimacy or objectivity of a [court] decision has to do more with its development
from a preexisting tradition and natural growth from an institutional soil than with
its approval by authority. This conception of objectivity explains the kind of constraint
on judicial choice that is, in fact, generally accepted by judges; it produces real
constraint on judicial choice while allowing growth in the law, and, in any event, it is
the only form of check on judicial interpretation of broad constitutional language we
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mutual constraints on language and the world apprehended through language is perhaps
found through analogy to literary criticism. Commenting on Dworkin's theory of judicial
interpretation, Stanley Fish offers an explanation of the process by which both the creator
and interpreter of literature are constrained by the language itself. 202 Regarding the
judge, he writes:
What would it mean for a judge to strike out in a new direction? Dworkin
doesn't tell us, but presumably it would mean deciding a case in such a way
as to have no relationship to the history of previous decisions. It is hard to
imagine what such a decision would be like since any decision, to be recog-
nized as a decision by a judge, would have to be made in recognizably judicial
terms. 2"
Any comprehensible attempt to escape law meaning, says Fish, "will have been implicit in
the enterprise as a direction one could conceive of and argue for." 209 Hence within a
language system as powerful as law, the range of potential possible meanings is limited
by the system itself. True judicial capriciousness, in the sense of' decisions that have no
relationship to received prescriptive doctrine, is virtually impossible.
In their creation of law, legislators are similarly constrained by the way of thinking
inherent in the legal vocabulary. This is illustrated by Fish's discussion of Dworkin's
"chain novelist" image, in which Dworkin likens law and its interpretation to a novel,
each chapter of which is written by a different person. 21 ° Only the first author, argues
Dworkin, is free to create without structure; the other authors in the chain are con-
fronted, and constrained, by the now historical text of the first chapter. 2 " Yet Fish
explains that the constraints are equal on the first, and the last, author in the chain:
Just as the first novelist 'creates' within the constraints of 'novel-practice' in
general, so do his successors on the chain interpret him For her] (and each
other) within those same constraints.. . . The last author is as free, within
those constraints, to determine what 'the characters arc really like' as is the
first. It is of course tempting to think that the more information one has (the
more history) the more directed will be one's interpretation; but information
only comes in an interpreted form (it does not announce itself). No matter
how much or how little you have, it cannot be a check against interpretation
212
• • • •
Interpretation, therefore, is neither compelled by the text nor assertable without con-
straint by the interpreter. Legislator and judge are yoked together in an ongoing indirect
can realistically hope to achieve.
The real constraint on judicial choice ... is produced by engaging in the process of'
decision rather titan by governance from outside. It is an appreciation of the rule of
this process and of the environment in which it takes place.
Bennett, .supra note 31, at 475,496.
207 Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 73.
208 1d. at 556.
2°9 1d. at 557.
210 Dworkin, Law As Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. Rev. 527,540-48 (1982).
211 Id. at 541-42.
212 Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 73, at 554.
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dialogue which, practically speaking, is the only way modern law may proceed. Truth
comes to be not "reality," but rather the relationship of a proposition to all others within
the meaning system, each providing for the others a part of a rational whole that must
be comprehended before the meaning of any individual proposition can be fully estab-
lished. 2 "
This notion of propositions taking on meaning from the theoretical structure in
which such propositions are embedded underlies Professor Schauer's work on consti-
tutional language.214 When part of an integrated constitution, he writes, even mundane
language takes on special qualities — it becomes "theory-laden," and therefore is much
less susceptible to discretional interpretation. 2 " The language of the Constitution itself,
rather than the supposed intentions of the framers, comes to have a density of meaning
that acts as an important constraint on all those acting within the legal systern. 216
Niklas Luhmann speaks also of the system of meaning which constitutes one indis-
pensable dimension of law. Terming it the "expectation of expectations," he conceives
of legal meaning as a common understanding of human expectations. This meaning
develops both as part of the mental equipment of individuals, and as systemic constraints
within legal programs. 217 Moreover, recalling the previous discussion of the "problem-
solving" constraint of the legal systeni, 2 " Luhmann states, "system problems are defined
by stating conditions of their solution (constraints) and ... the definition of the problem
itself arises from decision-making and is tested by decisions." 219 The meaning of the legal
system, in other words, comes to affect greatly not only the solutions that can be
conceived, but also the ways in which problems can be articulated. Meaning, as a systemic
quality, therefore restrains both the creation and the implementation of legal solutions.
213 As stated by Professor Chevigny:
Having abandoned the view of language as a 'copy' of the 'real world,' a set of names
for objects, and assertions that have meaning only to the extent that they faithfully
represent reality, philosophers increasingly think of language as a system of discourse
in which assertions can have 'meaning' and be 'true' not as representations of `reality'
but as ideas for which good reasons can be found in other parts of the system of
discourse. Essential to the meaning of any particular proposition is its relationship to
such a system, a relationship which cannot be established without inquiry into the
premises of both the proposition and the system of Clisco'urse. This is true for any
proposition, even if it purports to be 'factual' or 'scientific.'
Chevigny, supra note 105, at 162 (citations omitted). Tushnet further supports this position when
he writes, "Nile ways in which people understand the world give meaning to the words that they
use ...." Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 1, at 799.
514 Schauer, supra note 40.
Id, at 824-28.
215 Id. at 828-31.
217 Regarding legal meaning for individuals, Luhmann writes:
[Expectations] can enter a context of meaning which engenders reciprocal proofs and
agreements; they can be supported and defended with good arguments. As expecta-
tion, and not purely as the expected act, they can become capable of verbalisation,
symbolisation, representation, and objection. They can serve as point of crystallisation
for information, experience, traditions and interests. Such a context or meaning gains
a value in its own right for the individual .... [lit would be difficult to replace them
so quickly.
N. LuindANN, supra note 132, at 6'3.
718 See supra notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
219 N. LUHMANN, supra note 132, at 174.
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IV. CoNcLusioN
• Describing liberal epistemology, Unger writes,
It is ... theory that determines what is to count as a fact and how facts are
to be distinguished from one another .. [A] fact becomes what it is for us
because of the way we categorize it. How we classify it depends on the
categories available to us .... [R]eality is put together by the mind. 22°
Unger has classified many facts into a single category he calls liberalism, one that in his
eyes "must be seen all of a piece ...." 22 ' That is the singular flaw in the important
contribution of both Unger and Tushnet. They possess many insights into the less
agreeable aspects of Western culture and psychology. They react to these with a justified
sense of anger, and with a conviction that society can be transformed. With this analysis
and these goals the Author has no disagreement. But for these insights to become "facts"
by being categorized as "liberalism," and for that category then to be closed, is unjustified
and possibly dangerous.
The liberal heritage is nothing if not pragmatically inconsistent. 222
 It is a bundle of
diverse reactions against political and religious tyranny and social inequality. Some of
those reactions have been grievously naive or misguided, and some have indeed been
ruthlessly opportunistic. But to abandon liberalism in the name of community harmony
is counterproductive. Liberal adjudication supports individual resolve. Piecemeal, con-
flictual, incoherent, particular, it responds to grievances and enables local discourse about
community values. Over time, it has developed a structure of procedures and meanings
that has wider implications: it provides an assurance that official responses to grievances
are based on proofs and arguments presented from within that system of thought, and
it limits the feasibility of attempts from outside the system to take it over.
The complaint of Tushnet and Unger derives from a different implication of lib-
erally constituted adjudication: that its procedures and systemic meanings trivialize and
divert political discourse in ways harmless to its own preconditions. The system becomes,
in their view, stiflingly insulated and self-justifying. Although descriptively their point is
well taken, this phenomenon has little to do directly with liberalism. Circumscribing
institutional dialogue is linguistically unavoidable, because current formulations are
strongly directed by past assumptions. If the content of liberalism has any effect on this
tendency, it almost certainly is to soften it. This is because liberalism is highly open as a
philosophy. Externally, it permits change by erosion as well as accretion; internally, it is
singularly self doubting, and promotive of criticism.
Unger and Tushnet join that process by questioning the basic premises of liberal-
ism. 223
 We are indebted to their analysis, as it promotes understanding not only of the
failings of contemporary theories of adjudication, but also of the alternative possibilities
that liberal values afford. Yet the connections they identify between liberalism and
adjudication are neither analytical truths nor indisputable historical facts, but rather are
speculations about ideas changing through time, and the effects of those ideas on human
22° R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 32, 33.
221 Id. a , 6 .
222 D.J. MANNING, supra note 16, at 12-13.
222 See Chevigny, supra note 105, at 167-68, 180-81 (discussing the basic premises of liberalism).
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personality and social institutions. No causal relations have been demonstrated. Hence
if we are dissatisfied with legal and political life, it is not clear whether the problem lies
with liberalism, or with the legal system, or, for that matter, with the constructed visions
of those doctrines and system. It is too early in the day to advocate that the linkages
between law and liberalism be severed, or even assert that the objects examined have
been described definitively.
